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The Failure of the Integrated Enterprise
Test: Why Courts Need To Find New
Answers to the Multiple-Employer
Puzzle in Federal Discrimination Cases
MARK CRANDLEY"

We live in a society of increasingly complex relationships, where even basic
concepts and paradigms are subject to scrutiny and change. The employment
relationship has not been spared the complexity that marks these modem times. The
increase in independent and temporary work, the proliferation of tiny technologybased firms, and the creation of new corporate forms have altered the world of work
forever.'
Many employees no longer punch a time clock for the traditional employers who
formed the core of American work for years. In short, the world of employment
courts deal with today is simply not what it was when Congress passed the landmark
Civil Rights Act of 1964.2 Title VII of the Act forbade employers from discriminating
against employees on the basis of race, gender, religion, or national origin That
seemingly simple statement has been complicated by the complex corporate
employment systems of today. Many American workers can no longer answer a
simple question: Who is my employer?4

* J.D. Candidate, 2000, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.A., 1995,
Indiana University. I wish to thank Professor Kenneth Dau-Schmidt for his helpful comments
in reviewing this Note. I also wish to thank my fianced, Amanda Hewitt, for her never-ending
support throughout my legal education and my parents for their encouragement throughout my
life. I would also like to thank Steve and Cass Hewitt for all of their support.
1. See, e.g., THE 1996 ExECUTIVE FILE: HOT EMPLOYMENT ISSUES 77-78 (1996).

According to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), the number of
workers in new, temporary employment arrangements has continued to rise and includes anew
class of professional workers. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, EEOC Notice
915.002 (Dec. 3, 1997) (visited Mar. 6, 2000) <http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/conting.tt>; see
also U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 39-40 (1994) ("[M]any federal statutes limit
employer status to those parties responsible for hiring or firing, setting schedules, or actually
issuing the worker's paycheck. This model of the employment relationship is badly out of date
... .").However, fear of increased complexity in the employment relationship does not appear

to be wholly new, as a Brookings Institute report bemoaned the existence of new employment
structures a scant five years after Title VII's passage. See RICHARD P. NATHAN, JOBS &CIVIL
RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN PROMOTING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN

EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING 67 (1969) ("Discrimination today is much more subtle than in
the past. Increasingly, the EEOC must handle cases involving institutionalized and highly
sophisticated systems for selecting and promoting workers.").
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
3. See id § 2000e-2(a)(I) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
[to discriminate against an individual] because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.").
4. This confusion is only exacerbated by the circularity and uncertainty embedded in the
actual definitions of employer and employee in Title VII. Employer is defined as "a person
engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees." Id. §
2000e(b). An employee is "an individual employed by an employer." Id. §2000e(f). Taken as
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This Note analyzes one of the various tests courts have created to answer this
question-the integrated enterprise test. The test analyzes "whether the management,
ownership, and operations of nominally separate business entities are, in fact, so
interrelated that for purposes of Title VII they should be treated as a single
employer."5 Under this analysis, courts consider a variety of factors in determining
whether two or more distinct entities should be liable for the same discriminatory
conduct." This Note aims to show that this test is an over-extension of liability under
employment discrimination statutes and should be reformulated to accurately reflect
the nuances of federal discrimination law.'
To this end, Part I will set out the general scope of the integrated enterprise test and
will place the test in context by illustrating the ways in which it arises in federal court
cases. Next, Part II will detail the history of the test, including its growth in National
Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or "Board") cases, its place in the legislative history
of Title VII, and the subsequent importation of the test into the employment
discrimination context. Part III will then examine the arguments for and against
application of the test in the discrimination context, including an examination of the
key distinctions between labor and discrimination law. This analysis will lead to the
conclusion that the test is misapplied in cases of discrimination because it leads to
liabilities wholly outside of Congress's intent and inappropriate to discrimination
cases. Finally, Part IV of this Note will suggest several key alternatives to the
integrated enterprise test so that the courts may fashion appropriate remedies for
complex multiple-employer problems. Special attention is paid to an alternative
promulgated by the Fifth Circuit that aims to allow courts to focus their analysis on
actual discrimination and not corporate formalities.

a whole, the definitions shed little light on the matter. This confusion in the statutory
definitions has hardly gone unnoticed. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 1, at 36.
("[The definition of employee in labor, employment and tax law should be modernized,
simplified and standardized.").
5. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION COMPLIANCE MANUAL app. 605-G at 3 (1995).
6. See, e.g., Rogers v. Sugar Tree Prods., Inc., 7 F.3d 577 (7th Cir. 1994); Johnson v.
Flowers Indus., 814 F.2d 978 (4th Cir. 1987); Rittmeyer v. Advance Bancorp, Inc., 868 F.
Supp. 1017 (N.D. 11. 1994).
7. Title VII has played a leading role in most employment discrimination doctrines, and
the integrated enterprise test is no exception. However, the integrated enterprise analysis is
equally applicable (and has in fact been applied) to the full range of federal employment
discrimination statutes. See Sharpe v. Jefferson Distrib. Co., 148 F.3d 676, 678 (7th Cir. 1998)
("Many a case applies to the employment-discrimination laws (Title VII, the ADA, the ADEA,
and so on) the same approach the National Labor Relations Board uses to determine whether
multiple corporate entities should be treated as one employer."). This consistency stems mostly
from the fact that subsequent employment discrimination statutes have shared Title VII's
remedial purposes as well as similar if not identical definitions of employer. Compare 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (setting forth Title VII's definition of employer), with Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 630 (1994) ("ADEA") (defining employer almost precisely
the same as Title VII). Thus this Note will treat application of the test as the same under all
federal employment discrimination statutes.
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I. THE INTEGRATED ENTERPRISE FRAMEWORK:
FACTORS AND APPLICATION

The integrated enterprise test, which in older cases is often referred to as the single
employer test,' is simple in its components but complex in the contexts in which it
arises. The explicit language of the test is clear and courts have consistently relied on
the same fundamental factors when applying the integrated enterprise test. 9 However,
the true power and importance of the test lies not in its text but in the situations in
which it is invoked. Thus, to truly examine the significance of the test, one must
analyze both its factors and the circumstances in which it is applied.
A. The Factorsof the
IntegratedEnterpriseTest
The integrated enterprise test is aimed at allowing courts to consider two possible
employers as a single entity. In determining whether two entities are sufficiently
integrated, courts have regularly invoked four factors: interrelated operations, control
over labor relations, common management, and common ownership.'" These four
factors form the heart of the test, but courts have also set out guidelines as to how to
apply them. First, most courts have made clear that no single factor is dispositive."
The courts have also held that the test is meant to be "flexible" to fit the situation
facing the court and not rigidly applied. 2 In addition, courts have stated that the
factors are intended to be used to portray a business enterprise that is "highly
integrated with respect to ownership and operations." 3 Thesq concerns animate the
federal courts' application of the integrated enterprise factors, which will now be
dealt with in turn.

8. See Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1335 (6th Cir. 1981).
9. See Frank v. U.S. West, Inc., 3 F.3d 1357, 1362 (10th Cir. 1993);Armbruster,711 F.2d
at 1336.
10. See Sharpe, 148 F.3d at 679; Rogers, 7 F.3d at 581; Frank,3 F.3d at 1357, 1362-63;
Johnson, 814 F.2d at 981; York v. Tennessee Crushed Stone Ass'n, 684 F.2d 360, 362 (6th
Cir. 1982); Armbruster, 711 F.2d at 1332, 1335; Baker v. Stuart Broad. Co., 560 F.2d 389,
391-92 (8th Cir. 1977); Richard v. Bell Atl. Corp., 976 F. Supp. 40, 43 (D.D.C. 1997);
Rittmeyer, 868 F. Supp. at 1020. The Supreme Court has accepted the test in cases arising
under the National Labor Relations Act. See Radio & Television Broad. Technicians Local
Union 1264 v. Broadcast Serv. of Mobile, Inc., 380 U.S. 255, 256 (1965) (per curiam)
(expressing the test in terms of the NLRB'sjurisdiction). No Supreme Court case has applied
the test in an employment discrimination setting. Indeed, academics seemingly have also
ignored the test as there appears to be a dearth of scholarship addressed to it.
11. See Swallows v. Barnes &Noble Book Stores, Inc., 128 F.3d 990, 994 (6th Cir. 1997)
("None of these factors is conclusive, and all four need not be met in every case."); Rogers, 7
F.3d at 582 ("[T]he presence or absence of any one factor is not controlling.").
12. Cook v. Arrowsmith Shelbume, Inc., 69 F.3d 1235, 1240 (2d Cir. 1995).
13. Armbruster, 711 F.2d at 1338.
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1. Centralized Control of Labor
Relations and Personnel
Most courts applying the integrated enterprise test have come to the conclusion that
the labor control factor is the most important. 14 The courts generally require that the
control exercised by one entity over another must be unusually strong or outside the
typical relationship. For example, the Tenth Circuit has held that "[t]o satisfy the
control prong, [the] parent must control the day-to-day employment decisions of the
subsidiary."' 5 This control must transcend the mere promulgation of general
employment policies, and must reach the level of employment decisions affecting
employees ofthe second entities.' 6 The Fifth Circuit has held that "[s]uitable evidence
of centralized labor and employment decisions includes parental control of hiring,
firing, promoting, paying, transferring, or supervising employees ofthe subsidiary.""'
A typical application of the control prong is found in the Second Circuit case of
Cookv. ArrowsmithShelburne,Inc."8 The case centered on whether aparent company
could be considered a single employer along with its subsidiary in a Title VII gender
discrimination suit. 9 In holding that the facts of the case satisfied the control prong,
the court focused on the fact that all applications for employment with the subsidiary
were passed along to the parent. 20 The court also noted that the parent controlled all
major human resources decisions of the subsidiary.2' Most importantly, according to
the court, the plaintiff herself had been hired by an employee of the parent and fired
by a manager paid by the parent.' This type of control in the basic, direct
employment affairs of another entity is sufficient to meet the control prong of the
integrated enterprise test.
2. Interrelation of Operations
When courts analyze interrelation of operations, their focus tends to be, as in the
control prong, on the level of day-to-day authority exercised by the second entity over

14. See Swallows, 128 F.3d at 994; Rogers, 7 F.3d at 582; Rittmeyer, 868 F. Supp. at 1023;
cf Armbruster, 711 F.2d at 1338 ("All four criteria need not be present in all cases and even

when no evidence of common control of labor relations is presented, the circumstances may
be such that the... single-employer doctrine is applicable."). The Fifth Circuit has taken this
control analysis one step further and held that the relevant control must relate to the actual
discriminatory conduct over which the litigation arose. See Lusk v. FoxMeyer Health Corp.,
129 F.3d 773, 777 (5th Cir. 1997). This important change to the basic integrated enterprise
framework will be explored infra Part IV during the discussion of alternatives to the
interrelated enterprise test as usually applied.
15. Frank,3 F.3d at 1363.
16. See id.; Rittmeyer, 868 F. Supp. at 1023.
17. Lusk,129 F.3d at 780 n.8.
18. 69 F.3d 1235 (2d Cir. 1995).
19. See id. at 1237.
20. See id. at 1241.
21. See id.
22. See id. at 1242.
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the first.' The major difference is that this analysis centers on control of general
business operations and not matters of labor relations.24 The prong essentially
amounts to an examination of shared business functions. The EEOC has advised
analyzing such evidence as
the sharing of management services, such as check writing, the preparation of
mutual policy manuals, and the completion of business licenses; the sharing of
payroll and insurance programs; the sharing of services of managers and
personnel; using employees on the payroll of one entity to perform work [for] the
benefit of another nominally separate entity; sharing the use of office space,
equipment and storage; providing services principally for the benefit of another
entity or operating the entities as a single unit.'
It should be noted, however, that the fact that managers of one entity report to
managers of another is not dispositive of the interrelations prong.26 As one court has
noted, if the rule were otherwise this prong would be met in every case where the test
was applied to a parent and subsidiary because the officers of a subsidiary are always
in some sense responsible to those at higher levels of the corporate echelon.27
The court in Rittmeyer v. Advance Bancorp,Inc."6 employed a typical interrelation
of operations analysis.29 In this ADEA case, the district court determined that three
separate financial institutions were not an integrated enterprise." In examining the
companies' operations, the court first noted that they maintained separate facilities
and separate staffs." The court also noted that each company answered to a different
regulatory agency. 2 Most important to the court, however, was the fact that the
companies charged each other for services performed and equipment used. 3 This
presented to the court a sufficiently arms-length operating system to preclude the
application of this prong of the test.34

23. See Rogers v. Sugar Tree Prods., Inc., 7 F.3d 577, 583 (7th Cir. 1994).
24. See Rittmeyer v. Advance Bancorp, Inc., 868 F. Supp. 1017, 1021 (N.D. Il. 1994)
(holding that control prong centers on "common officers, common record keeping, shared bank
accounts and equipment").
25. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNrrY COMM'N, supranote 5, app. 605-G at 3 (citations
omitted); see also Ratcliffe v. Insurance Co. ofN. Am., 482 F. Supp. 759,764 (E.D. Pa. 1980)
(citing shared home offices in finding interrelated operations).
26. See Frank v. U.S. West, Inc., 3 F.3d 1357, 1362 (10th Cir. 1993).
27. See id.

28. 868 F. Supp. 1017 (N.D. Ill.
1994).
29. See id. at 1022.
30. See id at 1024.
31. See id. at 1022.
32. See id. at 1022-23.
33. See id. at 1024.
34. See id. at 1022.
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3. Common Management
The common management prong looks to see if the two entities share the same
directors, officers, managers, or other key personnel." As such, the common
management prong of the test can easily become a numbers game. However, courts
do not simply count up managers to bind two entities together, especially when a
parent-subsidiary relationship is involved.16 Courts applying the test often note that
these last two prongs of the test cannot, without more, convert superficially separate
entities into an integrated enterprise.3 7 Thus common management is a necessarybut not sufficient-criteria of an integrated enterprise: it alone will not meet the
integrated enterprise test, but its absence can defeat it.
An interesting application of the common management prong occurred in Richard
v. Bell Atlantic Corp." The district court in that case held that Bell Atlantic was
sufficiently integrated with its subsidiaries to be considered a single employer with
them.39 One hurdle the court had to clear in reaching this conclusion was that there
was apparently only one common manager and "few common officers" between the
two entities.40 There was also a case from the Tenth Circuit stating that one common
manager does not establish an integrated enterprise.4 The Richardcourt, by stressing
the paucity of shared management, seemed to acknowledge that at least numerically
the case before it was below what courts generally require in integrated enterprise
cases. 42 However, the court took an approach to the problem that was more nuanced
than numerical. The court noted that the single manager was in a crucial position in
terms of labor relations and the court stressed that who shared managers are, not how
many there are, is the crucial common management analysis. 43 As the court put it:
"While [Bell Atlantic] and its subsidiaries have few common officers and do not have
interlocking Boards of Directors, the area where there is overlap is too central to the
allegations in this case to ignore." 44 But not all courts have been as generous, and
Richard likely represents the outer limits of the common management analysis.
4. Common Ownership or Financial Control
Common ownership is the most straightforward factor of the integrated enterprise
test. Courts applying this prong simply look to see if there is some nexus of shared

35. See id. at 1023 (finding no integrated enterprise despite fact that holding company
shared five directors with one bank and six with another).
36. See Lusk v. FoxMeyer Health Corp., 129 F.3d 773, 778 (5th Cir. 1997).
37. See Rogers v. Sugar Tree Prods., Inc., 7 F.3d 577, 583 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that
"more is needed" than common ownership and management); Frank v. U.S. West, Inc., 3 F.3d
1357, 1362 (10th Cir. 1993).
38. 976 F. Supp. 40 (D.D.C. 1997).
39. See id. at 48-49.
40. Id. at 48.
41. See Frank,3 F.3d at 1364.

42. See Richard, 976 F. Supp. at 47-48.
43. See id.
44. Id. at 48.
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financial ownership or control between the separate entities. 4 As with
common
46
management, this factor alone cannot establish an integrated enterprise.
The reason this factor is not dispositive is amply demonstrated by the Seventh
Circuit case of Sharpev. Jefferson DistributingCo.47 The defendant in that case was
a venture capitalist who financed a start-up software firm and had little day-to-day
control over the new firm.48 The plaintiffs claimed that the court should consider the
Illinois firm as an integrated enterprise with a beverage distribution company in West
Virginia, both of which were owned in part by the venture capitalist.49 The court said
the investment by the venture capitalist was the only realistic tie between the two
companies.5 0 "[N]either Title VII nor any other federal law lumps together as one
firm all businesses owned by a single person."'" This is especially important in light
of the fact that a main limit to Title VII is its inapplicability to small business, the
entities most likely to be run by single owners.5"
B. The Application of the IntegratedEnterprise
Test in Real World Settings
In a vacuum the integrated enterprise test seems neither valuable nor powerful. Its
analysis of organizational structures seems more mundane than momentous. But the
worth of the test arises in the crucial situations in which it is invoked. First, as already
alluded to, the test frequently arises in the parent-subsidiary context. 3 Second, the test
is often invoked to allow plaintiffs to meet the statutory minimum number of
employees found in almost all employment discrimination statutes. 4 The test
similarly aids plaintiffs in eluding the strict procedural requirements of Title VII and
other discrimination statutes."5 The test is also commonly applied in the context of
temporary employees, an increasingly important part of the economy. Finally, and
more subtly, the test not only allows plaintiffs to find deeper pockets in defendants,

45. See Sharpe v. Jefferson Distrib. Co., 148 F.3d 676, 678 (7th Cir. 1998).
46. See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY CoMM'N, supranote 5,app. 605-G at 5 ("[I]t
is also the Commission's view that, when the only interrelationship between two nominally
separate entities is common ownership, the entities, generally, will not be considered to be an
integrated enterprise.").
47. 148 F.3d 676.
48. See id. at 677.
49. See id
50.See id. at 678.
51. let A particularly persuasive example of common ownership and management is
presented by Baker v. StuartBroadcastingCo., 560 F.2d 389,391 (8th Cir. 1977), where two
companies were owned and operated by a single family.
52. See 110 CoNG. REc. 5877 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1976) (statement of Sen. Byrd) ("I doubt
that in the history of the Congress has legislation been seriously proposed with more drastic
effects [on small business]"; discussing effect Title VII would have on a small manufacturing
plant). This aspect of the legislative history of Title VII will be discussed infra text
accompanying notes 64-70.
53. See Richard v. Bell Atl. Corp., 976 F. Supp. 40, 43 n.3 (D.D.C. 1997).
54. See Sharpe, 148 F.3d at 677.
55. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1994).

1048

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 75:1041

but allows them to target the entity that they feel is actually responsible in an
individual case.
1. Parent-Subsidiary Context
The most common situation where the integrated enterprise test arises is the parentsubsidiary relationship. 6 This is not overly surprising as the test was developed by
the NLRB as a way to deal with complicated business arrangements under its
jurisdiction.57 The parent-subsidiary relationship does not generally change the
courts' application of the integrated enterprise test, thus making this analysis more
descriptive than substantive.
One key difference that the parent-subsidiary context does make is that some courts
apply an analogy to state law "piercing the corporate veil" concepts."3 The fact that
the test arises in the parent-subsidiary context prompts these courts to require that the
parent exercise "a degree of control that exceeds the control normally exercised by
a parent corporation."5 9 For example, in Frank v. U.S. West, Inc.,'3 the court
considered the fact that a parent acted as the subsidiary's pension plan administrator
when it analyzed the measure of control the parent exerted over labor relations.6 The
court found that "it is not beyond the normal parent-subsidiary relationship for the
parent to serve as ERISA Plan Administrator for the subsidiary."'62 Moreover, in the
parent-subsidiary context, courts occasionally require that the corporate entity be so
obviously structured to avoid Title VII liability that it amount to a "sham," similar to
the requirements necessary to pierce the corporate veil.63 Thus the parent-subsidiary
structure can affect the depth of the analysis involved in integrated enterprise cases.

56. See Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062 (10th Cir. 1998); Lusk v. FoxMeyer
Health Corp., 129 F.3d 773 (5th Cir. 1997); Schweitzer v. Advanced Telemarketing Corp., 104
F.3d 761 (5th Cir. 1997); Cook v. Arrowsmith Shelburne, Inc., 69 F.3d 1235 (2d Cir. 1995);
Rogers v. Sugar Tree Prods., Inc., 7 F.3d 577 (7th Cir. 1994); Frank v. U.S. West, Inc., 3 F.3d
1357 (10th Cir. 1993); Richard,976 F. Supp. 40; Rittmeyer v. Advance Bancorp, Inc., 868 F.
Supp. 1017 (N.D. Ill. 1994). While many applications ofthe integrated enterprise test deal with
parents and subsidiaries, it should be noted that the test arises in other contexts as well. See,
e.g., Mukhtar v. Castleton Serv. Corp., 920 F. Supp. 934 (S.D. Ind. 1996) (applying integrated
enterprise test to separate networks of immediate care centers).
57. For an in-depth exploration of the development of the test, see infraPart II.A.
58. See Lusk, 129 F.3d at 778 ("Only evidence of control suggesting a significant departure
from the ordinary relationship between a parent and its subsidiary--domination similar to that
which justifies piercing the corporate veil-is sufficient."); Sargent v. McGrath, 685 F. Supp.
1087, 1088-89 (W.D. Wis. 1988) ("In the absence of special circumstances, a parent
corporation is not liable for the Title VII and section 1981 violations of its... subsidiary.").
59. Johnson v. Flowers Indus., 814 F.2d 978, 981 (4th Cir. 1987).
60. 3 F.3d 1357 (10th Cir. 1993).
61. See id. at 1363.
62. Id.
63. See RONALD R. COLLINS &KIERAN SHARPE, FEDERAL REGULATION OF EMPLOYMENT
SERVICE § 1:12 (1982) ("[A] parent corporation and its subsidiary are not a single employer
for purposes of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, where the affairs of each corporation
are handled separately and the subsidiary corporation is not a sham.").
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2. Statutory Minimums
Federal discrimination statutes only apply to employers larger than a certain
minimum size.' These minimums are usually attached to the definition of employer
and require that the employee demonstrate that the employer had a certain number
of employees during a given period.65 For example, a Title VII plaintiff must show
that the defendant had at least "fifteen or more employees for each working day in
each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year."'
While this limitation might seem trifling, it has played a role in the development of
federal employment law. The limitation on Title VII's coverage was one compromise
that led to the bill's passage.67 For example, the language concerning the number of
calendar weeks in which the fifteen-employee status must be met was part of a noted
Senate amendment to the original House bill that eventually became the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.68 This extra protection for small employers arguably added crucial votes
during the Senate debate on Title VII. 9
For plaintiffs filing Title VII lawsuits in 1999, however, the upshot of these
limitations is that the named defendant must employ at least fifteen or more
employees. This motivates plaintiffs to make their employer "bigger" by
characterizing the employer as part of an integrated enterprise. For example, the
plaintiff in Sharpe v. Jefferson Distributing Co.7° invoked the test because the

software firm she worked for had only two employees.7' When the plaintiff's
integrated enterprise argument failed, so did any possibility of a federal
discrimination suit against the venture capitalist defendant. Similarly, the plaintiff
in York v. Tennessee CrushedStone Ass'n" needed to establish the existence of an
integrated enterprise as her direct employer was a trade group with two employees. 74
Again, the failure of the integrated enterprise test in that case disposed of any
discrimination suit against her employer.75 Thus the integrated enterprise test is a vital

device for plaintiffs working in firms with low numbers of employees.

64. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994).
65. See id.
66. Id.; see also Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (1994).
67. See, e.g., Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1337 n.4 (6th Cir. 1981) (discussing
a similar compromise in 1972 to change Title VII minimum number of employees from 25 to

current 15).
68. See EQUAL OPPoRTUNITY EMPLOYMENT COMM'N, LEGISLATIVE HISTORYOF TITLE VII
AND TITLE IX OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 3049 (amendment of Sen. Dirksen).
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

See id. at 3103, 3108 (comments of Sen. Willis and Sen. Humphrey).
148 F.3d 676 (7th Cir. 1998).
See id. at 677.
See id. at 679.
648 F.2d 360 (6th Cir. 1982).
See id. at 362.
See id.
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3. Procedural Requirements
Employment discrimination suits, particularly under Title VII, are replete with
procedural pitfalls. For example, suits under Title VII must be filed within ninety
days after a plaintiff receives a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. 6 The scope of the
suit is limited to the parties named in the EEOC complaint: "Ordinarily, a party not
named in the EEOC charge cannot be sued in a subsequent civil action."' Other
common procedural miscues include failing to meet the EEOC filing deadline,
requesting excessive remedial relief, failing to specify type of discrimination in the
EEOC charge, failing to exhaust contractual remedies, and failing to avoid workers'
compensation bar.78 Stringent procedures such as these make bringing an employment
discrimination claim perilous for the uninitiated plaintiff, and this danger is often not
lost on the civil defense bar. 79 The integrated enterprise test may help plaintiffs avoid
the harsh results these procedures can achieve by giving them a second chance
against a fresh defendant."0
4. Temporary Employees
As noted previously, the temporary employment market is an economic sector of
growing importance.8 The integrated enterprise test is useful here mostly to alleviate
confusion, and not necessarily out of pure need for numbers or to avoid procedural
necessities. The problem lies in that often neither the temporary employment agency
nor the company using the employment service is clearly the employer of the
temporary employees claiming discrimination. "Staffing firms may assume that they
are not responsible for any discrimination or harassment that their workers confront
at the clients' work sites. Similarly, some clients of staffing firms may assume that
they are not the employers of temporary or contract workers assigned to them. ... "'
The integrated enterprise test can help clarify this situation in cases where the staffing

76. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1994).
77. Virgo v. Riviera Beach Assoc., 30 F.3d 1350, 1358 (1 th Cir. 1994); see also Hassell
v. Harmon Foods, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 432, 433 (W.D. Tenn. 1971) (denying application of
integrated enterprise test when plaintiff failed to include defendant in EEOC charge).
78. See Jana Howard Carey, Defending Sexual Harassment Claims, in AVOIDING AND
LITIGATING SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS 38-46 (Jana Howard Carey ed., 1998).
79. See id. at 39-40.
80. It should be noted that the Virgo court, as well as others, followed equitable and
remedial principles in declining to apply the bar on suits against defendants not included in the
EEOC charge. See Virgo, 30 F.3d at 1358. But not every court has been this generous, and
plaintiffs would be wise to follow the technicalities set out in the statutes. See, e.g., St. Louis
v. Alverno College, 744 F.2d 1314, 1316 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that 90-day period to file
suit begins to run upon attempted delivery of right-to-sue letter, not actual receipt).
81. See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, EEOC Notice 915.002
(Dec.3,1997) (visited Apr. 21, 2000) <http://www.eeoc.gov/does/conting.txt>.
82. Id.See generally Gil A. Abramson & Mark S. Saudek, Guidanceissuedon Application
of EEOC Laws to Temp Workers, EMPLOYMENT L. STRATEGIST, Jan. 1998, at 1, availablein
LEXIS, HR Library, LEA EMP file (discussing EEOC release on temporary employees and
federal discrimination law).
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agency and its client have an inordinately close relationship, especially since courts
do not always require a showing of common ownership. 3
5. Deep Pockets, Deeper Emotions
Finally, a subtle undercurrent of strategy runs through almost all integrated
enterprise cases. Many plaintiffs have more in mind in choosing a defendant than
getting around statutory minimums or making up for past procedural miscues. Surely
many plaintiffs target their suits based on the capitalization of the company and seek
the "deep pockets" that will make their suit sting. Many also surely feel deep scorn
towards the allegedly discriminatory corporation, and thus attempt to serve their
deeper emotions through the suit. For example, in Richardv. Bell Atlantic Corp.,84
the parent company undoubtedly had more attractive resources than the smaller
subsidiary, as the parent had a net income ofjust under $3 billion in 1998." While
some of the search for deep pockets is mitigated by statutory caps on damages, a little
defendant shopping is not an inherently bad result in the context of the integrated
enterprise test. If the test is in fact aimed at discouraging corporations from setting
up "sham" structures to avoid liability, courts should encourage plaintiffs to seek the
deepest pocket, as that entity is most likely the one that set up the "sham" to protect
itself. 6
Perhaps more important to many plaintiffs is the "deeper emotions" at play in
discrimination suits. The type of discrimination envisioned by the federal statutes can
have severe traumatic effects on its victims. As one scholar has noted, "[tlhe
psychological symptoms and effects of sexual harassment include anger, fear,
depression, anxiety, irritability, loss of self-esteem, feelings of humiliation,
embarrassment, shame and alienation, and a sense of helplessness and
vulnerability."8 " Several integrated enterprise cases present situations where there is
no objective reason why the plaintiffs would need the defendant in question in the
suit except as an outlet for deeper emotional scorn. A notable example of this
occurred in Swallows v. Barnes& Noble BookStores, Inc."8 The plaintiffs in that case
were former employees at an on-campus bookstore that was once owned by the

83. The temporary employment relationship could gain even more prominence ifthe courts
were to more heavily emphasize the joint employer alternative. See Brent Giddens, Sexual
Harassment,Other DiscriminationSuits andthe TemporaryEmployee, SEXUAL HARASSMENT
LrrxG. REP., Mar. 1997, at 22, availablein LEXIS, HR Library, ANDSHR File; Henry W.
Sledz, Jr. & John J. Lynch, The Legal Ramifications of Using Independent Contractors,
TemporaryAgency Employees, Leased Workers, 9 CBA REC. 20 (1995); infra Part IV.A.
84. 976 F. Supp. 40 (D.D.C. 1997); see also Lusk v. FoxMeyer Health Corp., 129 F.3d
773, 777 (5th Cir. 1997) (applying integrated enterprise test where subsidiary declared
bankruptcy).
85. See Media Kit FactSheet (visited Mar. 31, 2000) <http://wvw.bellatlantic.com/invest
/financial/annual98/>.
86. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 1, at 40.
87. Claudia Withers, PreventingSexual Harassmentin the Workplace, in AVOIDING AND
LITIGATING SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS, supra note 78, at 109, 113.
88. 128 F.3d 990 (6th Cir. 1997).

1052

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 75:1041

university but was subsequently leased to Barnes & Noble. 9 While the plaintiffs
named the book retailer in the suit, they also named the university.' There is no hint
that the plaintiffs faced a procedural problem, nor was there any doubt that Barnes
& Noble had more than fifteen employees.9' Perception underlies the plaintiff's suit
against the university. The plaintiffs must have perceived that the university, which
had originally hired many of them, had participated in the discrimination and should
be held to the fire in federal court. Swallows is certainly not the only case to present
this type ofperception-based use of the integrated enterprise test. In Lockardv. Pizza
Hut, Inc.,' the plaintiff was a former waitress at a Pizza Hut restaurant.9' To her, the
nationwide chain-not the individual franchise-was her employer and the target of
her scorn. 4 This kind of emotion and perception is another useful purpose that
plaintiffs have found for the integrated enterprise test.
II. DEVELOPMENT

OF THE

INTEGRATED ENTERPRISE TEST

Any worthwhile critique of the integrated enterprise test and its application to
federal employment discrimination law would not be complete without tracing the
test's birth and subsequent development. Accordingly, this Part begins by focusing
on the formative applications of the test by the NLRB in the late 1940s and 1950s.
The focus then shifts to the legislative record of Title VII's enactment in the 1960s
to discover what intent, if any, Congress harbored toward the application of this test
in discrimination cases. Finally, this Part discusses the last stage ofthis development,
the application of the test in EEOC administrative determinations and federal court
discrimination cases in the early 1970s, focusing on what distinctions, if any, these
early administrative and court cases drew between the test in the employment
discrimination context and its usefulness in labor law cases.
A. Developments in the NLRB

The initial development and application of the integrated enterprise test came in
National Labor Relations Board administrative law proceedings in the late 1940s and
1950s." 5 The test arose as a response to situations involving complex employment
structures that skirted close to the NLRB's jurisdictional minimum." Unlike the

89. See id. at 991.
90. See id
91. See id. at 992-93.
92. 162 F.3d 1062 (10th Cir. 1998).
93. See id. at 1066.
94. See id. at 1070-71.

95. See National Hardware Corp., 80 N.L.R.B. 368 (1948); 21 NLRB ANN. REP. 14-15
(1956). Hints of the test's development were demonstrated almost since the Board's inception.
See NLRB v. Lund, 103 F.2d 815, 819 (8th Cir. 1939) (discussing importance of labor control,
"dependent operation[s]," in approving Board's finding that three employers could be treated
as one).

96. See Moving Picture Mach. Operators Local No. 159, 115 N.L.R.B. 952 (1956)
(applying integrated enterprise test to denyjurisdiction); Metco Plating Co., I 10N.L.R.B. 615,
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employment discrimination statutes, the minimums for the NLRB focus on the
volume of the defendant's interstate business.97 For example, the Board currently
asserts jurisdiction over a general company doing at least $50,000 in interstate
business. 9
Questions of jurisdiction were especially thorny for the NLRB at the time the
integrated enterprise test came into full use because of the broad jurisdiction granted
to the Board by Congress. The Board's jurisdiction is meant to have the broadest
reach possible: "Because the National Labor Relations Act applies to all labor
disputes that affect interstate commerce, the Board has consistently taken the position
that Congress has given it jurisdiction that is coextensive with congressional
legislative power under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution."" Thus during the
formative days of the integrated enterprise test the NLRB was tentatively exploring
the depth of its jurisdiction. Indeed, a 1959 amendment to the National Labor
Relations Act allowed the Board to expand its jurisdiction but not to contract it.' 0
A corollary to this jurisdictional exploration and experimentation is the tendency
in early cases to expand the applicability of the integrated enterprise test.' In these
cases, the trial examiners, the lower courts of the NLRB process, rigorously applied
the integrated enterprise factors and required them to be supported by a great deal of
evidence. 2 As the Board'sjurisdiction grew in other areas, the full Board seemingly
began to experiment with expanding jurisdiction through the integrated enterprise
test.'03 For example, in the often-cited case of Sakrete, Inc.," the trial examiner
declined to exercise jurisdiction despite evidence that would support a finding of an
integrated enterprise today.' The Board reversed this lower level finding based on

616 (1954) (applying integrated enterprise test to allow jurisdiction); 21 NLRB ANN. REP. at
14-15 (discussing integrated enterprisetest in context ofjurisdiction oftheNLRB). TheNLRB
even then realized that the world of work was changing and corporate structures were
becoming more complex. "The fact that the corporate setup here is more involved... can not
be allowed to obscure its source and power." Moving PictureMach. Operators,115 N.L.R.B.
at 955 (Murdock and Peterson, A.L.JJ., dissenting).
97. See BETTY W. JusTICE, UNIONS, WORKERS, AND THE LAW 25 (1983); STANLEY R.
STRAUSS &JOHN E. HIGGINS, JR., PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE BEFORE THE NLRB § 3.02 (5th
ed. 1996); DAVID P. TWOMEY, LABOR LAW AND LEGISLATION 54 (7th ed. 1985).
98. See STRAUSS & HIGGINS, supra note 97, § 3.02.
99. Id. § 3.01 at 9; see also 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1994) (giving NLRB jurisdiction "to
prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice... affecting commerce").
100. See STRAUSS & HIGGiNS, supra note 97, § 3.01 at 10.
101. See National Hardware Corp., 80 N.L.R.B. 368, 369 (1948) (finding integrated
enterprise where officers and directors for two different companies were identical).
102. See Orkin Exterminating Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 622 (1956).
103. See, e.g., Sakrete, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1220 (1962); Orkin Exterminating Co., 115
N.L.R.B. at 622.
104. 137 N.L.R.B. 1220.
105. CompareSakrete, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1220 (finding, at trial examiner level, that two
entities were not an integrated enterprise despite the fact that one person made virtually every
management decision for both entities), with Frank v. U.S. West, Inc., 3 F.3d 1367, 1364 (10th
Cir. 1993) (finding common management, integrated enterprise with just one common
manager).
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the amount of authority exercised by the parent."° The case involved an Ohio
corporation, Sakrete, Inc., and a California subsidiary, Sakrete of Northern
California. 07 The control exerted by the Ohio parent was definitely above ordinary.
The subsidiary could not sell products or enter into contracts unless approved by the
parent.' Moreover, the subsidiary did not even have the power to lay off its own
employees." ° As the Board noted, "management of both resides virtually in one
man. '" 0 What is remarkable about this case is not that the review board found that
the two companies were one under these facts, but that the trial examiner believed
that the integrated enterprise test was so stringent that it was not met even under these
facts. Sakrete lays down the gauntlet of jurisdictional expansion through an
expanding integrated enterprise test. It is a signal that the test in its infancy was
intended to have a broad and malleable reach, similar to the broad and malleable
jurisdiction of the Board."'
B. Legislative Historyof Title VII
When Congress was debating the Civil Rights Act of 1964, obscure administrative
proceedings of the NLRB were not exactly foremost in its collective conscience. Thus
the debates over Title VII never turned to the integrated enterprise test. The closest
Congress came to debating the test came during its discussion of the definition of
employer under the Act. As noted previously, the section of Title VII that contained
the definition of employer was somewhat controversial."' One of the many
compromises leading to the Act's passage was the Senate's alteration of the
calculation of the number of employees' 1 and the graduated system of applying Title
VII to small business." 4 The actual definitions of employer and employee, the most
instructive part of Title VII for purposes of the integrated enterprise test, were
clouded during the debate by these more controversial proposals. The only
discernable reference to the definition of employer during the debates on Title VII
occurred during an oft-noted exchange of questions and answers between Senators

106. See Sakrete, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. at 1223.
107. See id. at 1221-22.
108. See id. at 1222.
109. See id. at 1223.
110. Id.
111. See Orkin Exterminating Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 622, 626-27 (1956) (reversing trial
examiner's refusal to apply integrated enterprise test where subsidiary managers had almost
complete autonomy and relied on parent only for assistance with national level sales and some
supplies); Modem Linen & Laundry Serv., Inc., 110 N.L.R.B. 1305, 1306 (1954) (finding
integrated enterprise where companies did not exchange employees, share labor policies, or
combine basic management functions); Venus Die Eng'g Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 336, 337 (1954)
(finding integrated enterprise in company in which 95% of control and ownership rested in one
family, but not in a single person). The Board was not always as expansive in its reading of the
integrated enterprise test, however. See Moving Picture Mach. Operators Local 159, 115
N.L.R.B. 952 (1956).
112. See supratext accompanying notes 67-69.
113. See 110 CONG. REc. 12807, 12811-12 (1964) (amendment of Sen. Dirksen).
114. See id. at 6563 (statement of Sen. Kuchel).
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Clark and Dirksen."5 Senator Dirksen posed the question:
Who is an employer within the meaning of [T]itle VII? I am not sure, the bill is
indefinite, we have no committee hearings, no report. Can an employer readily
ascertain from the language of the bill whether or not he is included? Employers
of employees will have no difficulty, but what of the small
with a large number
6
businessman?"
Senator Clark attempted to answer this question by simply stating that "[t]he term
'employer' is intended to have its common dictionary meaning, except as expressly
qualified by the act." 1 7 Taking Senator Clark at his word, it would appear that
Congress's intent was to have courts turn to the dictionary to discern meaning from
the statutory definition. Webster's defines employer as "one that employs something
or somebody as... the owner of an enterprise (as a business or manufacturing
firm).""I Employ is defined as "to provide with a job that pays wages or a salary or
with a means of earning a living."' " 9 In this light, turning to the dictionary proves
hardly more illuminating than the circular Title VII definition itself. At best, by
focusing on "one," "an enterprise," and "a business," the dictionary seems to indicate
that a person can have only one employer. But this is an extrapolation from what little
light the legislative history sheds on this issue. The most helpful sentiment that can
be gleaned from Senator Clark's definition is that common sense and common
knowledge should guide the determination of employer status under Title VII. Like
the dictionary definition, common sense would suggest that a person can have only
one employer, and that is the immediate company for which they work. As one court
has noted, "when one speaks of his or her 'employer,' as that term is commonly used,
they are not generally referring to the parent corporations of the immediate business
which pays their salary."'2 0
While the direct authority is sparse and generally unhelpful, there are also two
sources of indirect legislative history. First, one way to discern the intent of Congress
is to examine the thoughts of those who opposed a particular statute and the record
contains some opposition comments on point. Second, Congress was aware that more
than half of the states had enacted their own employment discrimination statutes,'
and the form these statutes took is relevant to Congress's intent in enacting Title VII.
For purposes ofthe integrated enterprise test, the most illuminating argument made
by an opponent of Title VII came from Senator Robertson." The Senator's speech
compared Title VII to minimum wage legislation passed in the 1930s.1' Senator

115. See icl at 7216.
116. Id.
117. Ia Senator Clark's veritable dismissal of the complications arising out ofthis definition
is proof that the drafters of Title VII did not foresee the complex employment schemes that
would crop up in the subsequent 35 years.
118. WEBsTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 743 (1981).

119. Id.
120. Armbruster v. Quinn, 498 F. Supp. 858, 861 (E.D. Mich. 1980), rev 'd,711 F.2d 1332
(6th Cir. 1983).
121. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 14249 (1964).
122. See id.at 5934.
123. See id
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Robertson argued that both the wage legislation and Title VII were measures based
on alleged horrible conditions, and were thought of as moderate, sober solutions to
those problems.'24 He next noted that the definition under the 1938 Act was narrow,
and intended to be limited.'11 But over time the scope of the bill swallowed more than
it was ever intended to reach, "[t]hus, as in the terms of an old Eastern proverb: 'Did
the nose of the camel enter the tent?' What now is in the coverage? Practically
everything."' 26 The import of Senator Robertson's words is clear: the scope of Title
VII should be clearly defined and rigidly followed so as to avoid an unintended
growth in its coverage, similar to that which occurred in the wage statute. As the
Senator noted: "Inevitably, when one employer is brought under an FEPC [Fair
Employment Practice Commission] law, he will demand that all competitors be
placed under the same operating handicaps."' 27
A final source of congressional intent is found by turning to the various state
provisions that regulated employment discrimination that were already on the books
by the time Congress passed Title VII. Those heavily involved in the debate around
Title VII were aware of these state statutes.2 2 As one Senator said at the time: "Some
25 States already have such laws .... The coverage of such laws is generally as
1
broad or broader than the coverage of [T]itle VII.
' 29 Unfortunately, none of these
states offered a definition of employer any more detailed or illuminating than that
found in Title VII. For example, Rhode Island defined employer as "any person in
this state employing four (4) or more individuals, and any person acting in the interest
of an employer."' 3 California deemed an employer to be "any person regularly
employing five or more persons, or any person acting as an agent of an employer."''
New York's FEPC law simply stated that the "term 'employer' does not include any
employer with fewer than four persons in his employ."'32 No state court applying
these definitions found fit to apply the integrated enterprise test prior to the passage
of Title VII. For example, Massachusetts did not incorporate the integrated enterprise
test into its state law until 1993.2 The most that can be gleaned from these laws is
that the legislatures understood the term employer to have a plain meaning similar to
that suggested by Senator Clark.' None of these states saw fit to pass elaborate

124. See id.
125. See id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See id. at 6562, 6563 (statement of Sen. Kuchel); id. at 6548 (statement of Sen.
Humphrey).
129. Id. at 6548 (statement of Sen. Humphrey).
130. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-6(6)(i) (1956) (current version at R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-6(6)(i)
(1995)).
131. CAL. LABOR CODE § 1413(d) (1965) (current version at CAL. GOV'TCODE § 12926(d)
(West 1999)).
132. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 292(5) (Consol. 195 1)(current version atN.Y. EXEc. LAW §292(5)
(Consol. 1993)).
133. See Daigle v. Alexander, No. 91-5588F, 1993 WL 818723 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 5,
1993).
134. See CAL. LABOR CODE § 1413(d); N.Y. ExEc. CODE § 292(5); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-56(6)(i).
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definitions of employer, and New York did not bother to provide a definition at all,
but merely provided exclusions.' This suggests again that the best approach to
multiple-employer problems is to rely on common sense and what a reasonable
person would deem to be an employer.
C. EarlyDevelopments in DiscriminationCases
The first appearance of the integrated enterprise test in the discrimination context
came in EEOC administrative decisions during the early 1970s.'" Interestingly, these
cases often only listed three prongs of the test: common ownership, common
management, and interrelation of operations.17 There is no discussion as to why the
central question of the test in modem integrated enterprise cases-the control over
labor relations-was not imported at this time. Seemingly this factor has the most
bearing on discriminatory conduct: two entities that share the same workforce
management are much more likely to share in the same discriminatory practices
against their employees. Also missing in these early cases is discussion of the
motivation and authority for importing the test from the NLRB. Instead, these early
cases simply lay out the structure of the test and cite a series of labor board cases for

authority.'
At about the same time, the integrated enterprise test first appeared in federal court
decisions. The first federal case to apply the test was Williams v. New Orleans
Steamship Ass'n. 39 To be sure, the Williams court did present somewhat more
detailed reasoning as to why the integrated enterprise test should apply in
employment discrimination cases. The court's primary reason was reliance on the
EEOC's interpretation of the statute it was created to enforce. 4 ' "[C]ourts ought to
and do give great weight to an agency's interpretation of the statute that it
administers."'' The court held that the integrated enterprise test was sufficiently

135. See supratext accompanying note 132.
136. See EEOC DecisionNo. 71-1677,3 Fair Empl.Prac. Cas.(BNA) 1242 (Apr. 12, 1971);
EEOC Decision No. 71-2598, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 21, 22 (June 22, 1970).
137. See EEOC Decision No. 71-1677, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1242; EEOC
Decision No. 71-2598, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 22.
138. See EEOC Decision No. 71-1677, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1242; EEOC
Decision No. 71-2598, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 22. The EEOC followed a similar
pattern of importing a related test, that ofjoint employer liability. See EEOC Decision No. 721301, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.(BNA) 715, 716 (Mar. 8, 1972) (citing NLRB cases to apply
joint employer test); EEOC Decision No. 72-0679,4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.(BNA) 441 (Dec.
27, 1971) (same). The joint employer liability test is discussed infra Part IV.A.
139. 341 F. Supp. 613, 615 (E.D. La. 1972) ("[Noo case has been found where a court has
applied this theory to a Title VII suit...
140. See id.
141. Id. It should be noted, however, that the one EEOC case Williams citd was in fact a
joint employer case. See id. (citing EEOC Decision No. 71-1537, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA)766 (Mar. 31, 1971)). The other authorities Williams relied on were NLRB
determinations, and the NLRB has no power to interpret federal discrimination statutes. This
flaw is not mentioned in cases relying on Williams as authority. See, e.g., Baker v. Stuart
Broad. Co., 560 F.2d 389, 392 (8th Cir. 1977).
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established to warrant this level of deference and thus applied the test. 142 The court
did not discuss the underlying validity or merit of the test, nor did it evaluate reasons
why the discrimination cases might require a different analysis.
Although Williams can and has been fairly credited with establishing the integrated
enterprise doctrine in federal discrimination litigation, 4 it was not the only
significant early court case dealing with multiple-employer situations under federal
discrimination laws. In Hassellv. Harmon Foods,Inc.,'"4 the court reached a distinct
result that temporarily proved influential. The Hassellcourt was faced with a plaintiff
who had neglected to appropriately include all parties in the EEOC charge. 4 The
court refused to pierce the corporate veil, holding that the defendant corporations
could not be considered a "sham." 46 The court did not believe that it had the statutory
authority to hold two employers simultaneously liable under Title VII:
Thus the question sharply presented is whether, in an ordinary parent-subsidiary
situation, can the fact that there are two corporations be ignored for present
purposes and the corporations be treated as one? There is nothing in the statutory
language or legislative history which supports the contention
that you can and
47
there is no case called to our attention that so holds.1
This strong rebuke of the integrated enterprise test held sway with some courts early
48
on, but the integrated enterprise test quickly gained acceptance in federal courts.
Hassellis but an anachronism today. For example, the district court in Armbrusterv.
Quinn149 relied on Hasselltolimit the scope of parent corporation liability under Title
VII.1S' The court of appeals overturned the district court, establishing the integrated
enterprise test's applicability in the Sixth Circuit.'

142. See Williams, 341 F. Supp. at 615.
143. See 1 FEDERAL REGULATION OF EMPLOYMENT SERVICE § 1:12 n.24 (rev. 1982).
144. 336 F. Supp. 432 (W.D. Tenn. 1971).
145. See id. at 433.

146. Id
147. Id. (citations omitted). Hassellis still often cited for the proposition that a parent should
not be held liable for the discriminatory conduct of its subsidiary unless the corporate structure
amounts to a "sham." See, e.g., EEOC v. Wooster Brush Co. Employees Relief Ass'n, 727
F.2d 566, 572-73 (6th Cir. 1984); Sargent v. McGrath, 685 F. Supp. 1087, 1090 (E.D. Wis.
1988).
148. See Baker v. Stuart Broad. Co., 560 F.2d 389, 391-92 (8th Cir. 1977) (applying
integrated enterprise based on Williams, liberal interpretation of remedial statutes); EEOC v.
Upjohn Corp., 445 F. Supp. 635, 638-39 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (importing integrated enterprise test
to discrimination context without discussion).
149. 711 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1983).
150. Armbruster v. Quinn, 498 F. Supp. 858, 860-61 (E.D. Mich. 1980), rev'd, 711 F.2d
1332 (6th Cir. 1983).
151. See Armbruster, 711 F.2d at 1335.
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CRITIQUING THE APPLICATION OF THE INTEGRATED
ENTERPRISE TEST IN THE CONTEXT OF
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

From the preceding section it is clear that the EEOC and the federal courts have
made the leap from applying the integrated enterprise test in labor cases to applying
it in the discrimination context. With the factors, utility, and history of the test firmly
in mind, this Part will attempt to show that this superficially simple transition is in
fact fraught with pitfalls. To make this showing, this Part tries to do what the EEOC
and the early federal courts apparently did not attempt: a systematic critique of the
arguments for the applicability ofthe integrated enterprise test in discrimination cases
and an exploration of the arguments against it.
A. Argumentsfor the IntegratedEnterprise
Test in DiscriminationCases
The arguments supporting the integrated enterprise test in discrimination cases fall
into two general categories. First, courts themselves have offered several arguments
for the test, including: deference to administrative agencies, liberal treatment of
remedial statutes, and the similarity between the definitions of employer in Title VII
and the NLRA. A second group of arguments is more fundamental and strikes instead
at the policy reasons for applying the test. These arguments center on the
conceptualization of the separate entities as a single employer and the ease ofjudicial
administration of the test.
1. Arguments Invoked by the Courts
Williams itself made clear that its primary basis for applying the integrated
enterprise test was the fact that the EEOC had applied the test in Title VII multipleemployer situations. 5 2 The theory behind this federal doctrine of deference to
administrative proceedings is that administrative agencies are uniquely qualified to
interpret the statutes they were created to enforce. The courts rely on this "expertise"
so that they do not have to undertake the kind of probing analysis already completed
by the administrative agency. As noted previously, the Williams court's deference
was misplaced in that the EEOC cases it cited were in fact "joint employer" cases.'
Moreover, the EEOC was still developing the integrated enterprise doctrine at the
time Williams was decided,' 54 and the test in discrimination cases was certainly not
yet worthy of the generous deference the courts give to the expert practices of
administrative bodies.

152. Williams, 341 F. Supp. at 615.
153. See supranote 141.
154. For example, in 1971, the year before Williams was decided, the EEOC reported just
two integrated enterprise cases. See EEOC Decision No. 71-2598, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 21, 22 (June 22, 1971); EEOC Decision No. 71-1677,3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1242 (Apr. 12, 1971).
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More fundamentally, it can be argued that such deference should not be blind. A
misinterpretation of a statute is not transformed into bedrock law by its passage
through the docket of an administrative agency. Judicial deference should not tolerate
administrative error. If an administrative law doctrine is fundamentally flawed, courts
should analyze and rectify the law. If, as this Note attempts to show, there are
conceptual and practical flaws in the application of the integrated enterprise test to
discrimination cases, courts should not rely on this veil of deference alone.
Unlike Williams, most federal courts rest their application of the integrated
enterprise test on something more than mere deference. A common theme is the
principle that remedial statutes should be given a liberal application to effectuate their
underlying purpose.' The theory is that remedial statutes are aimed at attacking
broad social problems and as such construction of them should keep a keen eye on
facilitating those remedial purposes. As one court put it: "To effectuate its purpose
of eradicating the evils of employment discrimination, Title VII should be given a
liberal construction. The impact of this construction is the broad interpretation given
to the employer and employee provisions."'" 6
However, this reasoning, based as it is on broad notions of congressional intent,
should not be used to reach conclusions that run counter to more specific indications
of congressional intent. As noted previously, one ofthe core compromises leading to
the passage of Title VII put small businesses beyond the Act's antidiscriminatory
reach. 57 Moreover, the provisions limiting Title VII to employers with more than a
certain number of employees are as much in effect today as they were when Title VII
was passed in 1964. Congress's intent remains clear: small businesses should not be
held to the hard standards of Title VII.'5s This intent is evident and should be taken
seriously. Thus the truism of "remedial construction" should not be extended to a test
which will override explicit indications of congressional intent.
Finally, several integrated enterprise cases have relied on the fact that the definition
of employer in discrimination statutes strongly resembles that of employer in the
NLRA. s9 The definitions do, in fact, bear a strong resemblance. Title VII offers the
paradigmatic definition of employer for federal discrimination law: "The term
employer means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen
or more employees." 60 The NLRA definition of employer states that "the term

155. See Virgo v. Riviera Beach Assoc., 30 F.3d 1350, 1359 (1 th Cir. 1994) ("Consistent
with the purposes of the Act we interpret the term 'employer' liberally."); Armbruster v.
Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1336 (6th Cir. 1983); Trevino v. Celanese Corp., 701 F.2d 397, 403
(5th Cir. 1983); Baker v. Stuart Broad. Co., 560 F.2d 389, 391 (8th Cir. 1977).
156. Armbruster, 711 F.2d at 1336 (citation omitted).
157. See supratext accompanying notes 64-69.
158. Some courts make much of the fact that in 1972 Congress reduced the required number
of employees from 25 to 15 and argue that this change indicates Congress's displeasure with
the employee limitation on Title VII. See, e.g., Armbruster,711 F.2d at 1337. This reduction
is capable of an equally persuasive but opposite reading: by lowering, but not eradicating, the
restriction on employer size, Congress again endorsed this protection for small employers.
Moreover, this revised limitation has now survived for 28 years.
159. See Rivas v. Federacion de Asociaciones Pecuarias de Puerto Rico, 929 F.2d 814,820
n.15 (1st Cir. 1991); Armbruster, 711 F.2d at 1336.
160. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994).

2000]

FAILURE OF THE INTEGRATED ENTERPRISE TEST

1061

'employer' includes any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or
indirectly."'' These definitions certainly do share a common generality. Both are
vague and do not offer specific standards to apply to specific settings. Both
definitions leave it to the courts to craft particular solutions for the particular settings
of labor and discrimination. But this vagueness merely begs the question. Since both
definitions are general, what rules can courts establish to answer the specific needs
of both bodies of law? This underlying inquiry cannot be eluded by reference to the
similarity in the definitions. As mentioned earlier, the definition of employer in
discrimination statutes has been criticized as vague and misleading.6 Reliance on a
similarly vague and misleading labor law definition is no answer to this problem. One
generality should not support another.
2. Policy-Based Arguments
Severalpolicy arguments, while not always explicitly offered in court opinions, can
also be cited for support of the integrated enterprise test as a tool in discrimination
cases. First, the federal courts need to find answers to legal problems in an efficient
fashion. The first courts faced with multiple-employer situations surely searched for
logical solutions to the puzzle and sought answers through analogy. The courts
simply looked at how otherjudicial bodies facing related questions have solved their
dilemmas. At least superficially, the integrated enterprise test appears as a logical
solution to a complex riddle. Thus the test was in part promulgated for ease and
efficiency. This argument is further buttressed by the fact that judges do not have
time for those quandaries that attract academics. Moreover, many of the same courts
that imported the integrated enterprise test were also faced with tough questions of
substantive discrimination, which only naturally drew their close scrutiny away from
the procedural topics.'63
Obviously efficiency alone cannot support an expansion of Title VII, and the search
for justifications for the integrated enterprise test must probe deeper. One powerful
argument for the test is its conceptualization of the supposedly separate entities as a
single employer. If the entities are inseparable, liability for one is indistinguishable
from liability for the other.'" The idea was expressed aptly in Lusk v. FoxMeyer
Health Corp.: "Courts ... have construed the term employer broadly to include
superficially distinct entities that are sufficiently interrelated to constitute a single,
integrated enterprise."' 65 Thus at a certain level of integration two entities stop being
separate and are considered one for purposes of the federal discrimination statutes.
"[D]istinct entities may be exposed to liability upon a finding that they represent a

161. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1994).
162. See supra note 4.
163. See, e.g., Swallows v. Barnes & Noble Book Stores, Inc., 128 F.3d 440 (6th Cir. 1997)
(discussing agency issues and integrated enterprise).
164. This argument only works, however, for those situations where the defendants are
parent and subsidiary. Many cases applying the integrated enterprise test appear wholly outside
the parent-subsidiary context, and this argument should not apply to them. See, e.g., York v.
Tennessee Crushed Stone Ass'n, 684 F.2d 360, 362 (6th Cir. 1982) (applying integrated
enterprise to see whether trade association, not corporate entity, was in fact a single employer).
165. 129 F.3d 773, 777 (5th Cir. 1997).
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single, integrated enterprise: a single employer."' This analysis can be taken further
with the unsurprising normative proposition that corporate entities should not be able
to escape liability for their discrimination by shuffling their corporate structure. 67
Thus, even cases like Hassell,which rejected the idea of the integrated enterprise or
any liability for multiple entities, would still hold liable a corporate system that is
nothing more than a "sham."'' 68
While certainly this core "single employer" analysis is the most persuasive
argument for the integrated enterprise test, it too is not without flaws and limits. The
primary problem with this "single employer" argument is that the test in application
tends to focus strongly on the single employer factors while not examining the
realities of the situations before them. 69 The idea behind the test is to prevent
defendants from elevating form over substance and defeating liabilities by shuffling
their corporate structure. But many of the courts applying the integrated enterprise
test do not make this "shuffling" the central question in their analysis. Instead, the
courts have held that the test looks mainly at the more superficial factors of highly
integrated ownership and operations.17 0 These inquiries, however, are not fully
relevant to whether the corporation has structured itself to evade liability. The factors
of the test alone will not reveal a sham corporate structure. Both integrated ownership
and operations can exist in a perfectly legitimate corporate form. Thus the courts
seem to rely too much on the legal fallacy that an integrated enterprise constitutes a
"single employer" and not on the underlying activity of the corporate defendants.
This analysis places liability for discrimination wholly in the hands of whether
individual judges feel a corporation has crossed an arbitrary line through a series of
only semi-relevant factors.
Moreover, this single employer showing has serious consequences when considered
with the corporate law principles of limited liability. As noted in Johnson v. Flowers
Industries, the primary purpose of establishing limited liability in the parentsubsidiary context is "to stimulate business investment by permitting individuals to
take action in corporate form without the risk of direct liability or involvement.''
Because of this legitimate purpose for limited liability, courts will pierce the veil of
corporate structure only "'to the extent that the subservient corporation manifests no
separate corporate interests of its own and functions solely to achieve the purposes
of the dominant corporation."" ' While this presumption of limited liability should
not act as a shield for sham corporate structures, federal courts should not run
roughshod over this basic corporate law premise."n But this is exactly what occurs

166. Trevino v. Celanese Corp., 701 F.2d 397, 404 (5th Cir. 1983).
167. See U.S. DEP'TOF LABOR, supranote 1, at 38-40.
168. Hassell v. Harmon Foods, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 432, 433 (W.D. Tenn. 1971).
169. See York, 684 F.2d at 362.
170. See supra text accompanying note 13.
171. 814 F.2d 978, 980 (4th Cir. 1987).
172. Id. at 981 (emphasis added) (quoting Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National Distillers &
Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098, 1106 (5th Cir. 1973)).
173. The Seventh Circuit has recently noted an additional argument against this vein of the
integrated enterprise test, one focusing on the Erie doctrine and choice of law principles. In
Sharpe v. Jefferson DistributingCo., 148 F.3d 676, 678 (7th Cir. 1998), the court noted that
"an unresolved choice-of-law question lurks behind [integrated enterprise based] employment-
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when the courts simply rely on the fallacy of a "single employer."
Even if the courts were to require a higher "sham" showing as in typical "corporate
veil" cases, it is difficult to see how the NLRB factors alone can lead a court to
assume that an entity is in fact a sham in the context of employment discrimination.
The factors as promulgated by the NLRB focus on what is a very real problem in
labor law----"double breasting."'74 This labor tactic involves transferring work from
union shops to nonunionized entities in order to escape collective bargaining
obligations.'75 This anti-labor practice was alive and well at the time the NLRB put
the integrated enterprise test into full force. 76 The application of the test at that time
focused on acts crucial to a determination that the entities had in fact attempted to
evade the NLRB's jurisdiction through double breasting. For example, the fact that
a parent and subsidiary shared facilities'" or freely exchanged employees'78 both may
establish the prongs of interrelated operations and labor control while also showing
that a company had engaged in double breasting. It can be said that the integrated
enterprise factors themselves are uniquely suited for a showing of sham liability in
the labor context and developed as a response to a real problem in labor cases.
The same cannot be said of the integrated enterprise test in the discrimination
setting. There is no statistical or anecdotal evidence that this kind of double breasting
occurs in the employment discrimination context. Employers certainly have at least
a superficial interest in limiting their exposure to discrimination suits. But a large
measure of callousness attaches to structuring a corporation around avoiding liability
for discrimination. This callousness does not attach in the purely economic context
of labor relations. Discrimination is a social evil that employers are cognizant of and
presumably do not turn a wholly blind eye towards.7 Avoiding this type of liability
through sham entities is different in kind from avoiding the purely monetary sting of
labor law. Even if one is not willing to assume that America's corporate enterprises
are keen on recognizing and eliminating discrimination, it is not a huge leap to
suggest that corporations at least do not wish to harm their employees. Moreover,
most employers (including the most sophisticated) are so well above the meager
fifteen-employee limit that it would be almost impossible to structure themselves to

discrimination cases." The court refused to address the issue as the parties had not briefed it.
Presumably, Judge Easterbrook was alluding to the fact that corporate law is primarily the
province of the states. Thus, the argument would go, the federal courts should follow state law
principles in determining corporate law cases and not follow federal common law. This tricky
Erie question is beyond the scope of this Note, but should not be dismissed as a plausible
attack on the integrated enterprise test.
174. See 132 CONG. REc. 7844-45 (1986) (statement of Rep. Jeffords).
175. See JUSTICE, supranote 97, at 268.
176. See Moving Picture Mach. Operators Local No. 159, 115 N.L.R.B. 952 (1956)
(applying integrated enterprise test to motion picture theater chain involving multiple levels
of interlocking entities, each of which was beneath thejurisdictional minimum for theNLRB).
177. See Metco Plating Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 615, 616 (1954); Venus Die Eng'g Co., 110
N.L.R.B. 336, 337 (1954).
178. See Orkin Exterminating Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 622,625 (1956); Central Dairy Prods. Co.,
114N.L.R.B. 1189, 1190 (1955).
179. See generally Withers, supra note 87, at 109, 112 (citing study that found sexual
harassment costs a Fortune 500 company about $6.7 million a year in lost productivity).
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avoid Title VII liability. For example, the court in Richardv.Bell Atlantic, Inc. held
that Bell Atlantic was an integrated enterprise with its subsidiaries for purposes of
summary80judgment without once mentioning whether it believed the entity was a
"sham."' Bell Atlantic employed over 139,000 people in 1998.1', It would seem
beyond question that the fifteen-employee limit in discrimination suits did not
animate this corporation's structure. Without at least anecdotal evidence to the
contrary, courts should not be quick to assume that companies have structured
themselves to evade these liabilities and thus override the traditional notions of
corporate liabilities.'82
B. Arguments Against the IntegratedEnterprise
Test in DiscriminationCases
The arguments against the application of the integrated enterprise test in the
employment discrimination context essentially divide between arguments based on
the differences between labor and discrimination law and those that are not based on
these differences. The arguments based on the differences between labor and
discrimination law include the nature of the different liabilities, the jurisdictional
differences between labor and discrimination, and the usefulness of the factors in
each context. The arguments notbased on the labor-discrimination distinction include
the common sense meaning of employer found in the legislative history of Title VII.
1. Arguments Based on the
Discrimination-Labor Distinction
The result of finding an integrated enterprise is vastly different in the labor and
employment discrimination contexts. When the NLRB determines that an entity
constitutes an integrated enterprise, it allows the Board to assert jurisdiction over a
labor case.' The worst possible result is that a nonunion shop is suddenly forced to
deal with a union. For example, the Kentucky exterminators in OrkinExterminating
Co. were faced with collective bargaining for the first time and the complexity of
their employer-employee relations certainly increased.'" However, as the test was
used purely to determine the jurisdiction of the Board, it did not directly affect the
substantive liabilities of the parties.' 85 At worst it acted as a precursor to subsequent
collective bargaining with a union. Conversely, the courts do not generally treat the
question of employer status as jurisdictional in the context of discrimination

180. 976 F. Supp. 40, 43 (D.D.C. 1997). In fact, the court found Bell Atlantic to be an
integrated enterprise despite the fact that the plaintiffs presented no evidence at all on the
interrelated operations prong. See id.
181. See Bell Atlantic, Media Kit Fact Sheet (statistical data as of Oct. 21, 1998) (copy on
file with the IndianaLaw Journal).
182. It also bears mentioning that if a plaintiff could show that a corporate structure was
meant to avoid Title VII liability, the courts might grant the plaintiff a cause of action as the
parent's discriminatory structuring itself might amount to a discriminatory act.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 95-98.
184. See Orkin Exterminating Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 622, 625 (1956).
185. See supra text accompanying notes 95-98.
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disputes. 6 Instead, the test often arises in summary judgment motions or motions for
dismissal concerning the substantive liabilities of the parties."8 7
These differences are critical in several respects. First, a test explicitly designed to
function as a jurisdictional analysis is likely to be more superficial than an analysis
aimed at holding parties to substantive liabilities. In the NLRB context, the test can
only establish the jurisdiction of the Board, which might lead to mandatory collective
bargaining. It does not, however, forever alter the position of the defendant
corporation. A finding of integration in the labor context is merely a first step in the
long path ofnegotiations leading to an eventual collective bargaining agreement. The
corporation still has a strong nexus of control over this process and can protect its
own fate under the NLRB proceedings and subsequent negotiations. The defendant
in a discrimination suit, however, may be forced to accept liability. There are no
negotiations for the loser. The company is simply stamped with the permanent
liability for the purported discrimination. The difference between these liabilities is
as basic as that between contract and tort. The labor defendant still has plenty of
power to bargain in its process, and thus laws applying to it can rightfully be applied
loosely. The discrimination defendant, however, is being held to a tortious liability
and deserves the protection of certain and solid standards. This fundamental,
conceptual distinction between labor and discrimination liabilities strongly militates
against blindly importing labor concepts into the discrimination context.
A second argument based on this labor-discrimination distinction is that the test
was created by the NLRB for the purpose of jurisdictional expansion, while its
application in discrimination cases is in an area Congress intended to restrict-the
definition of employer. 8 As noted previously, the integrated enterprise test was put
into wide use at a time when the NLRB's already broad jurisdictional base was being
greatly augmented. 9 The flexible integrated enterprise test was apparently one way
to further this policy of jurisdictional expansion. The discrimination statutes,
however, do not share this basic notion of expansiveness in scope."9 The limit on the
number of employees is an important restriction in the statutes. The integrated
enterprise test derives much of its present power from its ability to allow plaintiffs to
elude these statutory minimums. But these prerequisites are part of the compromise
that made up Title VII and continue to be a fundamental part of discrimination law.
This floor on the size of employers liable under Title VII remains as vital today as it
did in 1964. The same can be said of the strict procedural requirements that also are
embedded in discrimination statutes and form part of the usefulness of the test.'91
These seemingly strict standards are meant to be taken seriously and should not be
easily evaded by plaintiffs. Thus the test's labor law purpose of expanding
jurisdictional coverage is alien to important principles of the discrimination statutes.

186. See Sharpe v. Jefferson Distrib. Co., 148 F.3d 676, 678 (7th Cir. 1998).
187. See, e.g., Rogers v. Sugar Tree Prods., Inc., 7 F.3d 577, 581 (7th Cir. 1994).
188. See supra notes 67-68, 94-108.
189. See supratext accompanying notes 98-100.
190. See I10 CoNG. REC. 6548-49 (1964).
191. See, e.g., Moore v. Sunbeam Corp., 459 F.2d 811, 820-21 (7th Cir. 1972) ("As part of
the compromise which made it possible to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1964, its sponsors
agreed to the inclusion of provisions which impose an extremely short limitations period on
private claims.").
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As a tool for expanding the jurisdictional reach of labor cases, the integrated
enterprise test is wholly inappropriate for the rather limited substantive scope of the
discrimination statutes.'9
A final argument against the test based on the differences between labor and
discrimination is that the actual factors of the test bare little relevance to the core facts
of a discrimination dispute." In labor cases, an analysis of the business context and
operations of the corporation is relevant to the dispute at hand. The Board, in making
its jurisdictional determination, cannot avoid evaluating the business structure of the
defendant as its jurisdictional minimums are based on the volume of interstate
commerce in which the defendant partakes.' 94 In discrimination cases, however,
analysis of ownership, business operations, and the like amount to a side show from
the main issue-discrimination. Under the integrated enterprise test, discovery and
pretrial motions focus not on the acts of the relevant parties but on seemingly
irrelevant matters such as corporate financing, the hierarchy ofofficers, and the board
of directors. Thus the integrated enterprise test amounts to a distracting exercise
during the course of a discrimination lawsuit.
2. Arguments Not Based on the
Discrimination-LaborDistinction
Outside of the differences between labor law and discrimination law, the primary
arguments against the integrated enterprise test stem from the legislative history of
Title VII. First, as made clear by Senator Clark, the definition of employer is to be
guided by common sense. 95 Stripping away veil-piercing concepts and legal fallacies
concerning "single employers," common sense seems to dictate that a person with
one job has one employer. As Hassell noted: "There is nothing in the statutory
language or legislative history which supports the contention that you can [have two

192. The Seventh Circuit recently emphasized this point in criticizing the integrated
enterprise test:
Where a focus on integration makes sense is in the original context of the fourfactor test: the determination by the National Labor Relations Board of whether
it has jurisdiction over an employer or, even more clearly, what the appropriate
bargaining unit is. If the work forces of two affiliated corporations are integrated,
there is an argument for a single bargaining unit covering both of them, and also
an argument that they should be combined for purposes of determining whether
the effect on commerce is substantial enough to justify the Board in asserting
jurisdiction. But there is no argument for making one affiliate liable for the
other's independent decision to discriminate. Courts that have borrowed the fourfactor test for use in the discrimination context have, perhaps, been insufficiently
sensitive to the bearing of context on the proper formulation of rules of affiliate
liability.
Papa v. Karty Indus., 166 F.3d 937, 942-43 (7th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).
193. See id. at 939 ("[T]he test was not custom-designed for answering exemption questions
under the antidiscrimination laws, but instead was copied verbatim from the test used by the
National Labor Relations Board to resolve issues of affiliate liability under the laws
administered by the Board.").
194. See STRAuss & HIGGiNs, supra note 97, § 3.02.
195. See supratext accompanying note 117.
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employers]."" The common sense determination that Hassellmade is supported by
the notion that the definition of employer in the statute is meant to reflect the
common dictionary definition of employer. 197 As noted previously, the Webster's
definition of employer focuses on the singular, and does not seemingly extend to the
multiple-employer setting in which the integrated enterprise test arises.'9 ' Thus the
integrated enterprise test defies both the common sense meaning of employer and its
common dictionary meaning, both constituting clear violations of legislative intent.
A second legislative intent argument lies in that the scope of Title VII was not
intended to have a continually expanding reach. Senator Robertson's comments on
Congress's past experience with wage laws show that those who voted on Title VII
feared an ever-expanding scope which would swallow the important limitations
placed on the Act.' The continuing vitality of size restrictions and strict procedural
requirements further the notion that the federal employment discrimination statutes
were intended to contain limitations beyond which liability could not follow. While
the temptation to aide plaintiffs falling into these harsh pitfalls is surely great, the
federal courts do a great disservice to the congressional intent behind these provisions
by allowing plaintiffs to employ a labor law test to avoid the standards of
discrimination.

IV. ALTERNATIVES TO THE INTEGRATED ENTERPRISE TEST
Even if courts fail to rejectthe integrated enterprise test in its entirety, at least some
alternatives should be explored. Courts have applied a variety of other solutions to
the problem of multiple-employer situations in discrimination cases. Keeping an eye
on the already noted strengths and weaknesses of the integrated enterprise test, this
Part will briefly sketch two possible alternatives to that test, and then suggest that a
third alternative is the analysis that federal courts should.follow. The first alternative
is the joint employer test, another NLRB-based test sometimes applied in federal
courts. A second option is to require courts to make a separate independent analysis
of every named defendant in order to determine which one is, in fact, the true
employer liable under the discrimination statute. Finally, a third, and arguably the
most acceptable alternative is a subtle modification of the integrated test employed
by the Fifth Circuit. This modification focuses the test on the employer's participation
in the underlying discriminatory acts.
A. The Joint Employer Test

The joint employer test is essentially a cousin of the integrated enterprise test in
that it was also developed by the NLRB in multiple-employer cases and was only
later applied to employment discrimination.'x The joint employer analysis does not
treat two entities as one, but focuses on joint control shared by two separate

196. Hassell v. Harmon Foods, 336 F. Supp. 432, 433 (W.D. Tenn. 1971).
197. See supra text accompanying notes 117-18.
198. See supra text accompanying note 118.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 124-27.
200. See 21 U.S. NLRB ANN. REP. 16 (1956).
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employers. "In the case of the single employer doctrine, the two entities are
essentially the same entity. In the case of the joint employer doctrine, the two share
control of the employee to such an extent that they both function as an employer." 21'
The test itself centers on the amount of control the entity in question has over the
employee:
The basis of the finding is simply that one employer while contracting in good
faith with an otherwise independent company, has retained for itself sufficient
control of the terms and conditions of employment of the employees who are
employed by the other employer. Thus, the "joint employer" concept recognizes
that the business entities involved are in fact separate but that they share or codetermine those matters governing the essential terms and conditions of
employment. 22
Thus courts applying the test are required to examine the amount of control the
entities exercise over the employees in question.
Like the integrated enterprise test, the application of the joint employer test falls to
several obvious criticisms. The first fault of this alternative is that it embodies many
of the same weaknesses of the integrated enterprise test. It too was developed by the
NLRB and is not wholly appropriate for the discrimination context. For example, the
joint employer test can be seen as an expansion of liability violating the legislative
intent of Congress and the statute's numerical limitations every bit as much as the
integrated enterprise test does. Moreover, the joint employer test equally speaks
nothing of the "sham" nature of the employment structure in dispute.
Besides its NLRB-based problems, the joint employer test also can be criticized
conceptually because it does not address the core issues of liability under the
discrimination statutes. The test claims to look atjoint control over employees by two
separate employers. The conceptual counterargument employers can make is that
while two employers may share control, they might not share in discriminatory acts
or practices. What one employer does with its control is not necessarily known or
condoned by the other. Thus in a multiple-employer setting under the joint employer
test, an employer could receive liability for an act completely out of its zone of
control. Simply because two employers are linked by shared control does not mean
strict liability should apply to an employer who has not participated in discrimination.'
Finally, the joint employer test's application in employment cases is greatly reduced
by its seeming lack of utility. Very few situations would arise in which two employers
would have the type of shared control necessary for this test, thus limiting its utility
as an answer to the multiple-employer enigma.0 3

201. Bonilla v. Liquilux Gas Corp., 812 F. Supp. 286, 289 (D.P.R. 1993).
202. NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 691 F.2d 1117, 1123 (3d Cir. 1982).
203. The utility of the joint employer test would most often arise in temporary employment
cases. See Giddens, supranote 83, at 22.
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B. IndividualAssessment
Federal courts have used a variety of tests to determine who counts as a direct
employer in single employer settings. 2" For example, the Seventh Circuit has
suggested looking at the "economic realities" of the employment relationship to see
if it amounts to one of employment."' By extension, the federal courts could require
that in each multiple-employer situation the plaintiffs must show that each defendant
meets the general test for a single employer. At a minimum, this approach would not
fall to the criticism of violating legislative intent, for it does comport with the
common sense notion that each person has one employer. The problem with this
application is that it does not fit any notion ofjudicial economy. This approach would
require courts to make complex, sometimes controversial, findings in almost every
multiple-employer case. Moreover, the courts have not agreed on a test for
determining who is an employer in the single employer setting.2 Plaintiffs would
also be required to do twice as much meaningless discovery into corporate structures
and the like than is required under the already distracting integrated enterprise test.
Finally, this analysis also fails to duplicate the veil-piercing function the integrated
enterprise test purports to contain. Corporate entities wishing to create sham
structures could simply craft their subsidiaries in such a way to avoid the single
employer tests and thus liability. This approach would simply change which sham
structures corporations would set up. So the approach of requiring individual
assessment of each purported employer also fails to meet some of the crucial
concerns animating a critique of the integrated enterprise test.
C. Fifth Circuit Modification
A reasonable solution to the quandary the integrated enterprise test poses is an
approach adopted by the Fifth Circuit in its integrated enterprise cases. While not
wholly abandoning the concept of the integrated enterprise, the Fifth Circuit has tied
the test to an analysis of whether the parent company has in fact participated in the
alleged discrimination or at least had direct control over the type of activity alleged
in the action. 217 "This analysis ultimately focuses on the question whether the parent
corporation was afinal decision-makerin connection with the employment matters
underlyingthe litigation.""8 The Fifth Circuit has said that the integrated enterprise

204. See Rogers v. Sugar Tree Prods., Inc., 7 F.3d 577, 581 (7th Cir. 1994); see also Frank
v. U.S. West, Inc., 3 F.3d 1357, 1362 n.2 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing three tests other than the
"economic realities" test for determining employer status under Title VII). A fuller exploration
of the permutations applied by the federal courts is beyond the scope of this Note.
205. Rogers, 7 F.3d at 581.
206. See Frank,3 F.3d at 1362.
207. See Skidmore v. Precision Printing & Packaging, Inc., 188 F.3d 606, 617 (5th Cir.
1999); Lusk v. FoxMeyer Health Corp., 129 F.3d 773, 777 (5th Cir. 1997); Chaiffetz v.
Robertson Research Holding, Ltd., 798 F.2d 731, 735 (5th Cir. 1986); Trevino v. Celanese
Corp., 701 F.2d 397, 404 (5th Cir. 1983).
208. Lusk, 129 F.3d at 777 (emphasis added); accordFrank v. U.S. West, 3 F.3d 1357,1363
(10th Cir. 1997) ("What entity made the final decisions regarding employment matters related
to the person claiming discrimination?"); see also Trevino, 701 F.2d at 404 ("This criterion has

1070

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 75:1041

factors are relevant "only as they bear on this precise issue."" Thus the Fifth Circuit
has modified the basic integrated enterprise test to include an analysis of whether the
second entity actually participated in the underlying employment matters and
decisions at dispute in the case.
This approach is meritorious in almost every way in which the general integrated
enterprise test fails. First, the Fifth Circuit modification does justice to the legislative
intent underlying the definition of employer. While the modification would still allow
one person to have more than one employer, it does not defy common sense to hold
liable entities that actuallyparticipatein discriminatory employment decisions. This
modification also respects the employee limits Congress placed on Title VII. 21° By
requiring the parent to have actually participated in the discriminatory conduct or at
least the fundamental employment matters related to it, the modification anchors the
test in substantive discrimination and prevents
a second entity from being swept
21
incidentally into the liability of the first. '
Another major benefit of the Fifth Circuit approach is that it serves many of the
veil-piercing purposes missing from modem integrated enterprise cases. By focusing
not only on the factors themselves but also on participation in the relevant
employment matters, this modification ensures that no sham entity will survive an
integrated enterprise analysis. No matter what sham entities a corporation could
devise, it could not participate in core employment matters without facing potential
discrimination liability. This variation of the test allows courts to be certain that the
complex corporate entities before them are not structured to avoid discrimination
liability.
The Fifth Circuit modification also answers some of the concerns arising from the
distinction between labor and discrimination.2 12 As noted previously, the distinction
between NLRB jurisdiction and discrimination liability mirrors the distinction
between contract and tort. By focusing on actual control over employment decisions,
the Fifth Circuit courts have held entities liable for their own conduct in areas where
they exposed themselves to some degree of accountability.2" 3 This analysis prevents
tort liabilities from being thrust upon entities which in no way participated in tortious
conduct.
Finally, the Fifth Circuit formulation has the added advantage of answering
concerns ofjudicial economy. By placing this extra step in the integrated enterprise
process, the courts have realistically placed an initial question before plaintiffs. Any
plaintiff invoking the integrated enterprise test must be able to demonstrate that the

been further refined to the point that'[t]he critical question to be answered then is: What entity
made the final decisions regarding employment matters related to the person claiming
discrimination."') (quoting Odriozolav. Superior Cosmetic Distribs., 532 F. Supp. 1070,1076
(D.P.R. 1982)). The Seventh Circuit has also recently weighed in with criticism of the
integrated enterprise test, and endorsed the Fifth Circuit analysis as one of a few acceptable
alternatives to the mainstream use of the test. See Papa v. Karty Indus., 166 F.3d 937 (7th Cir.
1999).
209. Lusk, 129 F.3d at 777.
2 10. See supratext accompanying notes 67-68.
211. See Lusk, 129 F.3d at 773.
212. See supra Part III.B.1.
213. See Lusk, 129 F.3d at 773.
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second entity was involved in the discriminatory employment matters. Because
plaintiffs must evaluate the likelihood of meeting this step, they would be able to
easily evaluate their likelihood of success before any deep discovery must be made
into the structures of corporate defendants. This will often prevent discrimination
disputes from falling into distracting excursions into corporate structure. Thus this
of the concerns which militate against the
Fifth Circuit modification answers 1many
4
basic integrated enterprise inquiry.
CONCLUSION

This Note has attempted to make a systematic inquiry into the structure,
application, and validity of the integrated enterprise test in the employment
discrimination context. The test's power comes from the complexity of the modem
employment scheme. Courts facing intricate multiple-employer settings are bound to
search for solutions in relevant bodies of law. This Note has explored how the EEOC
and the federal courts turned to labor law to apply the integrated enterprise test to the
discrimination setting.
This Note has examined the development of the test in NLRB cases as well as the
relevant legislative history of Title VII and the test's early development in EEOC
cases. This historical development forms part of a critique of the benefits and a
detailing of the weaknesses of the integrated enterprise test. The critique of the test
focuses primarily on the federal courts' inability to apply the integrated enterprise test
as a veil-piercing construct and the inappropriateness of the justifications that have
been offered for the test. The arguments against the test divide on arguments based
on the distinction between labor and discrimination law and those not based on this
distinction. The central labor-based distinction is that the test is an expansive
jurisdictional concept being applied in a setting where Congress has intended a
different set of limits and liabilities. The nondistinction-based arguments focus
mainly on the notion that dual-employer status violates the common sense approach
Congress intended the Title VII definition of employer to have.
This Note concluded by offering several alternatives to the basic integrated
enterprise test. The first two possibilities, joint employer liability and individual
determination of employer status, were briefly sketched, as were arguments against
such options. A final alternative, the Fifth Circuit modification of the integrated
enterprise test, was offered as a reasonable means of determining multiple-employer
questions. This alternative focuses on the control the entity in question exercised over
the relevant employment decisions, and thus elevated the integrated enterprise test to
a level more appropriate for the discrimination setting. This modification is a
plausible solution to the difficulties presented by multiple-employer determinations
in discrimination suits.

214. Another added benefit of this test is that it serves the "deeper emotions" value of the
integrated enterprise test. In a situation where an employer is exercising this much control over
the relevant employment matters, the plaintiff is much more likely to feel that the parent, not
the subsidiary, is the true source of the discrimination. As noted previously, the courts should
not be blind to this instinct. See supra text accompanying notes 86-94.

